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The Economic Effects of Compulsory Medical Licensing 
Vivek Rajasekhar 
Too Many Patients, Too Few Doctors 
Kamela Christara, a 47-year-old single mother with Lyme disease in western Massachusetts can’t 
find a personal physician. After calling three dozen practices, she has resorted to the emergency room at 
Cooley Dickinson hospital in Northampton when health problems arise. Christara is not alone in her dif-
ficulties. Since that state’s landmark health care reform was signed into law in 2006 by then-Governor 
Mitt Romney, Massachusetts has suffered acute doctor shortages in ten specialties, ranging from primary 
care to neurologists.1 A flood of previously uninsured residents now threatens the fragile network of 
health care providers. A study by the Massachusetts Medical Society found “critical” shortages in family 
practice and internal medicine, while a recent NPR story revealed that Holyoke Health Center in Ho-
lyoke, MA has over 1,600 newly-insured persons on its waiting list.2 The average waiting time for a new 
appointment stretches to 53 days, the longest it has been in 6 years. 
Although the situation in Massachusetts is particularly severe, the state is not alone in facing chronic 
doctor shortages. “The country needs to train 3,000 to 10,000 more physicians a year — up from the 
current 25,000 — to meet the growing medical needs of an aging, wealthy nation” says a recent article 
in USA Today. “Because it takes 10 years to train a doctor, the nation will have a shortage of 85,000 to 
200,000 doctors in 2020 unless action is taken soon.”3 While journalistic inquiry into the cause of this 
shortage usually attributes the problem to the usual suspects- disparities in reimbursement rates set by 
insurance companies, Medicare, and Medicaid, administrative work burdening physicians- the root 
cause of persistent shortages of qualified medical professionals remains unexamined. The supply of phy-
sicians in the United States does not respond to market forces, but rather, to political considerations. To 
practice within a state, clinicians must obtain certification from that state’s licensing board. One view of 
this is that it maintains quality within the health care system by ensuring that only qualified doctors may 
treat patients. In reality, licensure represents a barrier to entry that physicians interest groups have erect-
ed in order to restrict competition within the field. The economic effects are predictable- a decrease in 
supply of physicians and a drastic increase in their median wages. Meanwhile, the policy fails to protect 
consumers from incompetent doctors, and by raising the marginal cost of care, reduces the affordability 
of quality care and restricts patients’ access to treatment. 
The Shortage 
Nobel Prize-winning economist George Stigler outlines in his Theory of Economic Regulation,4 
“[the state], with its power to prohibit or compel... can and does help or hurt a vast number of indus-
tries.... regulation, as a rule, is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefit.” Mandatory medical licensing is a prime example of a regulation demanded by an industry 
(doctors) for their personal benefit (higher wages), and falls into the traditional framework of occupa-
tional licensing. At present, some states regulate over 500 professions in this manner, ranging from hair-
dressers to lawyers. While some rules simply require the individual’s name on a list, others demand an 
extensive process of testing, evaluation, and oversight. Medicine tends toward the latter. As the Europe-
an Institute of Business Administration Professor S. David Young points out, “indeed, it appears that 
every organized occupational group in America has tried at one time or another to acquire state licensure 
for its members. Today at least a fifth, and perhaps as much as a third of the work force is directly af-
fected by licensing laws.”5 The argument in favor of licensing laws is that it protects the general public 
from shoddy workers- the “incompetents, charlatans, and quacks.” In truth, licensing acts as a barrier to 
entry, the term used by economists to signify an obstacle that exists in entering a market. By placing on-
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erous requirements on the education of aspiring professionals (at great expense to them), and due to the 
limitations on the licensing boards’ willingness to hand out certification, this form of regulation can ef-
fectively create a shortage, where prior to, none would exist. 
In the case of the manufacturing a doctor shortage, the American Medical Association is the primary 
promoter and enforcer of compulsory medical licensing. Despite only representing 19% of American 
doctors, the AMA is considered one of the most powerful trade unions in the world. At the time of the 
country’s founding, America’s medical system contained a variety of healers, such as herbalists and hy-
drotherapists, in addition to the modern allopaths and osteopaths. Beginning in 1847, the American 
Medical Association began organizing to represent the interests of allopaths. At its founding convention 
in Philadelphia that year, one of the primary objectives outlined was the “upgrading of medical educa-
tion and concomitant reduction in the number of physicians.”6 Nevertheless, Census data indicates that 
in 1860, the United States possessed over 55,000 physicians, or roughly 175 per 100,000 citizens, one of 
the highest percentages in the world. Over the course of the next two decades, the AMA became more 
focused with regard to its ultimate goal. At a meeting in Cincinnati in 1867, the organization endorsed a 
resolution urging members to “use all their influence in securing such immediate and positive legislation 
as will require all persons, whether graduates or not, desiring to practice medicine, to be examined by a 
State Board of Medical Examiners, in order to become licensed for that purpose." Thus began, in ear-
nest, efforts to use medical examining boards as a conduit for entry into the profession. The first attempt 
at setting up these institutions came in 1874, when the State of Kentucky instituted the Kentucky Board 
of Medical Licensure. The AMA’s efforts culminated with the production of the Flexner report in 1910, 
which sanctioned allopathic medical schools and condemned homeopathic ones.7 Flexner pushed for the 
licensing of doctors and hospitals and government subsidies for medical research, with Congress and 
state governments acting swiftly on these recommendations. By 1915, only Alabama, Colorado, and 
New Mexico did not require a diploma in medicine nor an examination of applicants as a prerequisite for 
practice. 
The number of medical schools began to precipitously drop. In 1910, before the publication of the 
Flexner report, there were 130 medical schools in the United States. By 1944, there were just 69. The 
effect on doctors’ income was just as swift and remarkable, albeit in the opposite direction. Dale Strein-
rich points out,8 
“While physician incomes and prestige dramatically increased, so did the caregiving workload. 
Wolinsky and Brune (1994) report that doctors were firmly in the lower middle class at the time 
of the AMA's founding and made about $600 per year. This rose to about $1,000 around 1900. 
After Flexner, incomes began to skyrocket such that a 1928 AMA study found average annual 
incomes reached a whopping (for the time) $6,354. Even during the Great Depression, physi-
cians earned four times what average workers did. A 2009 survey put family-practice doctors 
(on the low end of the physician income range) at a median of $197,655 and spine surgeons (at 
the high end) at a median of $641,728. These figures are mind boggling to ordinary Americans, 
even in good economic times. In addition, the cyclical unemployment that throws workers out of 
jobs in almost all other industries with the arrival of recessions or depressions became nonexist-
ent among physicians after Flexner.” 
The shortage in doctors and number of medical schools has persisted until today. Only one new 
medical school was established during the 1980s and 90s.9 During this period, the population of the 
United States increased 29%, from 238 million to 308 million. As University of Michigan economics 
professor Mark Perry summarizes, “the supply of medical school graduates has remained basically flat 
for the last 30 years. At the same time, the demand for physicians' services has increased over time be-
cause of a population that is both increasing and aging (fig. 1).”10  
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Consequences and Solutions 
The traditional justification given for strict medical licensing, as with other forms of occupational 
licensing, has been to keep poor-quality clinicians out of practice. In theory, only practitioners that meet 
some threshold of capabilities can obtain their license. Since this argument is uncomplicated and can be 
communicated to laymen with ease and clarity, there is little to no opposition by society. Moreover, be-
cause the monetary benefits of licensing are concentrated in such a small group that lobbies heavily in its 
favor, but the policy’s costs are spread out amongst the relatively uninformed general public, occupa-
tional licensing is politically very difficult to oppose. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, there 
is little empirical evidence that medical licensing actually improves the quality of care, or even that it 
prevents bad practitioners from continuing treatment. State medical boards often rely on private organi-
zations to perform many of the background checks and testing functions, organizations that could con-
tinue to provide credentialing services in a private capacity even in the event of the board’s termination. 
Medical boards also have a poor record at disciplining errant providers. Often, colleagues do not report 
if they know a physician has committed a serious medical error, and if they do, they did not necessarily 
report them to the state medical board, but instead to their employer. Because establishing proof of sub-
standard care is an expensive affair, requiring expert testimony, lawyers, and witnesses, licensing boards 
do not investigate a large number of claims. A study of Florida physicians with malpractice payouts 
found that only 16% were sanctioned by that state’s medical board.11 Another report looking at doctors 
with ten or more malpractice payments between 1990 and 2005 found that only one-third had even been 
disciplined by their supervising licensing board.12 To make matters worse, there is a pattern of reluc-
tance at reporting negative outcomes to the public. The Federation of State Medical Boards’ records 
show that, in more than 65% of cases, the medical board and the offending physician reached an agree-
ment without the physician being found guilty, thus denying consumers an important record of low-
quality physicians to avoid.13 
Further, medical licensing commissions have justified their existence by requiring clinicians to ob-
tain higher and higher levels of education to perform the same functions, even if there is little evidence 
that more degrees actually improves patient care. For example, in 2012, California will begin requiring 
audiologists to obtain a doctorate (Au.D.), a requirement the Sacramento Bee has called an 
“extraordinary and costly mandate.”14 “The relationship between educational inputs and better health 
outcomes,” California State University- Northridge economics professor Shirley Svorny says, “is not 
that straightforward. It is not clear that those excluded by these high barrier to entry would not be com-
petent practitioners.” Mandating increasingly high levels of education to perform the same functions 
restricts employers, such as hospitals and clinics, from choosing among a wide range of education and 
training options. By limiting entry into the medical profession, onerous educational requirements can 
result in worse outcomes. These policies have also helped drive domestic health care costs skyward over 
the past several decades. As the Kaiser Family Foundation notes, U.S. health care spending was $7,681 
per resident in 2008, amounting to 16.2% of the nation’s GDP, the highest percent among industrialized 
countries. Health care expenditures were $2.3 trillion in 2008, over eight times the amount spent three 
decades ago.15 As one of the primary inputs into the production of health care, physicians’ wages are a 
significant portion of that inflation. The price of the extra years of mandated schooling, both in terms of 
its direct cost (tuition) as well as the opportunity cost of the lost wages during those years, is factored 
into the final price charged to the ultimate consumer of health care, the patient. 
Unfortunately, the persistent shortage of physicians also manifests itself in other ways. Waiting lists 
have become commonplace in medicine as a form of rationing the limited supply of health care services. 
In 1993, the average wait time from when a patient receives a referral to when they can see a specialist 
was 9.3 weeks. By 1997, that period was up to 11.7 weeks, and currently sits at 17.3 weeks.16 With the 
recent passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, bringing an expected 36 million new 
patients into the health care system, these wait times are only expected to be further lengthened. Other 
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consequences of doctor shortages and wait lists is the reduced time busy physicians can spend with any 
given patient, as well as the impinged health of patients that must go without a primary care physician. 
One of the major counterarguments to an unrestricted market for medical professionals is that it 
opens the door to “quack” doctors. However, according to Svorny, “medical licensing is ineffective and 
inefficient, and patients would be better served by relying on brand recognition when choosing their 
doctors.”17 Individuals searching for a physician or surgeon could use referral, word-of-mouth, or simply 
visit a reputable group practice or hospital. Patients could also evaluate health professionals on the basis 
of price and quality, much as they do when purchasing a car or eating at a restaurant. To this end, many 
economists have suggested making publicly available doctors’ qualifications- the degrees they hold, 
number of years experience, statistics on patient outcomes- and allowing patients to decide which practi-
tioners to visit based on this information. Also, medical malpractice serves a useful function with regard 
to eliminating incompetent doctors. An effective tort system for medical malpractice will accrue heavy 
costs on irresponsible doctors, driving them from the marketplace. Further, malpractice insurers offer 
discounts to physician groups that successfully reduce medical errors, or alternatively, penalizing physi-
cians that engage in “negligence-prone behavior” with higher premiums.18 On the other hand, hospitals 
tend to self-insure, and thus have a strong incentive to monitor the performance of their clinicians over 
time.  
It is difficult to predict precisely what regulatory features would develop in the absence of official 
government licensing. Yet, as one of the the most influential economists of the 20th century, Milton 
Friedman, explains, “the great argument for the market is its tolerance of diversity…. It renders special 
groups impotent to prevent experimentation and permits the customers and not the producers to decide 
what will serve the customers best.”19 Perhaps the most simple and direct route is to allow private cre-
dentialing in medicine- competing degrees, such as M.D.’s, D.O.’s, and whatever alternatives new or-
ganizations design. Individuals can choose what combination of education and licensing they prefer, and 
likewise, patients can choose what brand of physician they are most comfortable with. The accounting 
industry is one example of how medical licensure should operate. While any person can call themselves 
an “accountant” and open practice, numerous standards of certification exist to prove professional com-
petency. These include, among many others, the Certified Internal Auditor (CIA), the Accredited Busi-
ness Accountant (ABA), and the most widely-recognized, the Certified Public Accountant (CPA).20  
Conclusion 
While proponents of medical licensing state that these policies were instituted as a mechanism to 
protect patients, the evidence suggests that they have not helped to remove incompetent doctors from 
practice, but rather, have created an acute shortage of doctors throughout the American health care sys-
tem. Consequently, patient treatment has become more expensive and of lower quality. This form of oc-
cupation licensing is deliberate policy of organizations, including the American Medical Association, 
which use government regulation as a mechanism to raise the wages of the special interest group they 
represent, American doctors. A better system exists- one that balances safety with cost and access. This 
requires relying on the market forces to control the supply of doctors, utilizing the “invisible hand” that 
Adam Smith wrote about over two centuries ago. It means allowing consumers to choose physicians 
with competing standards of certification and forms of education, in order maximize innovation and effi-
ciency. Based on the failure of the status quo, patients have little to lose, but much to gain from eliminat-








Figure 1 demonstrates the empirical effects of medical licensing on doctor quantity and wages. Because 
licensing boards are only apt to hand out a fixed number of licenses for practice (a number that is now 
also restricted because of the limited number of medical schools), the supply for physicians shifts to a 
perfectly inelastic position (SL). The result is that the quantity of doctors under licensure falls to QL and 
their equilibrium wage rises to WL.  
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